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The EU is trying to bring Europeans 
together to promote peace and economic 
prosperity. Regional co-operation is just 
one tool which the Union can use to 
achieve these aims. The co-ordination of 
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Europe's defence industry is struggling to 
restructure and at the same time 
consolidate its resources. The 10 candidate 
countries are also looking to modernise 
and integrate their defence industry with 11 
their potential Nato partners. European 
Dialogue looks at how the two seemingly 
conflicting aims may coincide with both 
business and governmental aspirations for 
the future. 
INTERVIEW 
Following the changes which began in 
1989, Finland pursued a foreign policy 
aimed at EU membership. Commissioner 
Liikanen tells European Dialogue what 
Finland's objectives were during EU 
negotiations and how the present 
candidate countries can learn from this 
experience. 
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Not all EU members will enter 
economic and monetary union in 1999 . 
What should be the relationship between 
the "outs", still with their own national 
currencies, and the "ins" with their new 
single currency, the euro? These and 
other questions are explored in this series 
of articles. 
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The emerging democracies in central 
Europe and the Baltic states are finding 
their counterparts in the West willing and 
eager to bolster the democratic processes 
and help in building new political 
structures and parties. 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 26 
The Directorate-General for Economy is 
now producing six-monthly forecasts of 
economic progress in the 10 applicant 
countries. These figures give an indication 
of the progress made by each individual 
country towards establishing a fully 
functional market economy. 
LETTERS TO EDITOR 28 
Programmes such as Interreg and Phare 's cross-border co-operation (CBC) are 
- excellent examples of what 
the European Union (EU) is all about. Set up to promote co-
operation between neighbouring border regions after bearing 
the weight . of centuries-old national antagonisms, the twin 
programmes even today are known occasionally to ruffle a few 
feathers in centralised public administrations eager to preserve 
control over their national territory. 
But no other initiative exemplifies as strikingly the crucial 
endeavour central to the EU's history of patient community-
EU programmes such as lnterreg and Phare's cross-border co-
operation were set up to promote co-operation between neighbouring 
border regions after bearing the weight of centuries-old national 
antagonisms. 
building: to erase borders as factors of deep division and bridge 
the gaps left by centuries of armed struggle, power politics and 
nationalist fervour. 
The history of the Interreg initiative started in 1989 when a 
series of 14 groups of pilot schemes on cross-border co-
operation were undertaken, funded by a small budget of Ecu 
21m allocated by the European Parliament. In July 1990 the 
Commission decided to set up Interreg with four sets of 
guidelines defining the aims of the new initiative: 
• helping areas on the Community's external and internal 
borders to overcome development problems linked to their 
remoteness from the centres of national economic activity 
• encouraging the development of cross-border co-operation 
networks 
• helping the Community's border areas with non-member states 
adjust to their role as border regions of the single market 
• co-operating with non-member countries on the EU's 
external borders. 
The total funds allotted to the new initiative, later to be called 
Interreg I, eventually amounted to Ecu l.08bn, with three-
quarters of the money flowing to underdeveloped areas eligible 
for the EU's highest category of structural funding (objective 1). 
External border regions in Greece and the border regions 
linking Spain to Portugal were among the biggest recipients. 
2 
The initiative's unique character within the framework of EU 
policy initiatives were immediately apparent in its funding 
mechanism. Internal border programmes funded under Interreg 
became the only initiative where the budget was not allocated 
to individual countries, but to individual border areas under 
only one operational programme. 
Interreg I distinguished three types of activity: joint 
implementation of cross-border programmes, measures to 
further the creation of cross-border networks, and the setting up 
of joint institutional structures. Concrete measures funded 
among the 31 selected programmes included measures assisting 
small- and medium-sized enterprises and co-operatives, tourism 
development, water and energy supply and telecommunications 
projects, anti-pollution measures, rural development, 
improvement of transport infrastructure and promotion of co-
operation between training and higher education institutions. 
In the least favoured regions, however, three-quarters of funds 
were spent on improving communication and infrastructure. In 
the others the programmes tended to further job creation, co-
operation between economic and social groups and the 
exchange of know-how. 
A significant difference rapidly emerged between regions where 
a tradition and structure of cross-border co-operation had 
already developed and those where that type of experience was 
almost entirely lacking. Particularly in the south and on the 
periphery of the Community, few joint cross-border structures 
became operational and participation by local and regional 
authorities was limited. 
Notwithstanding the practical and sometimes administrative 
difficulties encountered in getting different national 
administrations to co-operate on a common project - with 
national capitals in the EU's more centralised states sometimes 
wary of giving local bodies the required scope for extensive co-
operation with cross-border counterparts - the Commission 
decided in June 1994 to continue the ambitious initiative into 
the period 1994-99. 
Interreg's increasing political significance also became apparent 
in the sharp increase in funding. This amounted to well over Ecu 
2.5bn by the end of 1995. Thirty-five per cent of the money has 
been dedicated to the EU's external border regions. 
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Developing the border area of Portugal and Spain continues to 
be one of the priorities of internal border regions' spending. 
The accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995 
significantly raised the total number of border kilometres and 
14 new programmes were added to the 45 already existing. This 
raised the number of operational programmes to 59 of which 
about half have already been approved by the Commission. 
The key co-ordinating mechanism for the EU Phare cross-border co-
operation initiative is the joint programming and monitoring committee 
composed of representatives of relevant central authorities, sectoral 
ministries and local officials of both EU and central European and Baltic 
countries. 
"Schemes of genuine cross-border co-operation have gained in 
importance compared with Interreg I, 11 the Commission 
declared in a presentation of the policy. This was partly due to 
the Commission's insistence on the creation of common 
decision-making procedures and to the increasing involvement 
of regional and local authorities as well as local economic and 
social partners. However, cross-border programmes where the 
project budget is actually managed by a single body remains 
very much the exception. 
In the same year Interreg II was being extended 
until the end of the decade, the Commission 
proceede~ to set · up a matching pro-
gramme within its Phare project of co-
operation with countries of central 
Europe and the Baltic states. 
With European Parliament support 
through the creation of a separate 
budget line for cross-border co-
* 
* 
suffers from differences in 
budgeting, programming 
and decision pro-
cedures. 
Whereas Interreg 
II is based on 
five-year-pro -
grammes, and funds 
are allotted on the 
ground to individual pro-
Sue Cunningham Photographic 
jects as they are presented, Phare-cross-border co-operation 
may work on annual appropriations only. Interreg funds are 
granted by monitoring committees, including national and 
regional representatives of the region or area concerned. 
Decisions on the funding of Phare-cross-border co-operation 
initiatives are adopted by the Commission only, after obtaining 
opinions from the relevant management committee. 
Commission staff involved in the two programmes have 
endeavoured as best they could to overcome structural 
impediments. 
The key co-ordinating mechanism for the EU Phare cross-
border co-operation initiative is the joint programming and 
monitoring committee (known as JPMC), composed of 
representatives of relevant central authorities, sectoral 
ministries and local officials of both EU and central 
European and Baltic countries. Concrete 
programme proposal are formulated by the 
Commission on the basis of the 
committee's recommendations, as 
communicated by governments of 
the region. 
These committees bring together 
experts from member states, Phare 
countries and the Commission. 
operation under the EU Phare 
programme, the Phare cross-border co-
operation programme, as it came to be 
called, was endowed with Ecu 150mjn 1994, Ecu 
169m in 1995 and Ecu 180m for 1996. Sue Cunningham Photographic 
These committees are supported by 
specialist working groups which 
include local representatives from the 
border regions and sectoral experts (for 
example, on transport or environment). 
The total for the period 1994-99 is estimated at about Ecu 900m. 
In addition about Ecu 700m of Interreg II appropriations 
cover schemes at the borders with central European 
countries and the Baltic states and approximately Ecu 30m are 
allocated to schemes with Russia. Again with European 
Parliament support through the creation of a budget line, the 
Commission has drafted a specific cross-border co-operation 
programme for the former Soviet republics, including Russia 
but excluding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which are part of 
the EU Phare programme. 
While experts in the Commission's Directorate-General XVI 
for regional development and in Directorate-General IA for 
external relations with Europe and the CIS, consider the overall 
balance of allocations between Phare-cross-border co-operation 
and Interreg to be broadly satisfactory, some express regrets 
about a less-than-optimal coherence in implementation which 
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Each neighbouring pair of member state and central European 
or Baltic countries has concluded an agreement outlining 
developing priorities, common programming and monitoring 
machinery. To counter the short-termism of the EU Phare 
cross-border co-operation yearly allocation mechanism, the 
Commission has drawn up indicative multi-annual programmes 
for the Phare cross-border co-operation sector in order to 
improve the consistency between initiatives under each 
programme. One of the ultimate goals and benefits of the Phare 
cross-border co-operation programme is the opportunity for 
candidate countries to get to know something about operating 
under EU internal cohesion programmes financed by EU 
structural funds (which are currently Ecu 145.Sbn for EU 
member states for the period 1994-99 and are certain to be of 
major importance to any future members of the Union). 
Perhaps even more than in the case of Interreg programmes, 
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Phare cross-border co-
operation are also seen to fulfil a crucial political task. The aim is 
to get regions to co-operate which for decades have been locked 
in a sullen historical antagonism, which found little expression 
during the years of official "socialist brotherhood". A legacy of 
distrust and resentment has to give way to a genuine commitment 
to close co-operation, if these countries are to become fully 
participating EU members. 
Under the cross-border co-operation programme, Albania, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia , 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are eligible for help 
which can alleviate administrative obstacles hindering cross-
border exchanges, bring about infrastructure improvements, 
common waste management projects, the promotion of tourism, 
rural development measures, health co-operation and support for 
media disseminating cross-border information. Romania is not 
included because it does not have a border with an EU country. 
Planning priorities listed for 1996 included an improved 
coherence between Phare and lnterreg through measures such 
as the exchange of observers between monitoring committees 
on both sides of the border, the improvement of central 
European countries' and Baltic states' implementation 
structures and the easing of procedures, and the extension of 
the LACE network. LACE (linkage association and co-
operation for the European border regions) , launched by the 
association of European border regions in support of lnterreg 
in 1990, makes use of consultants and local and regional experts 
and practitioners to help border regions with solving practical 
difficulties. The programme has been 
successfully extended to eligible 
countries under the EU's Phare 
cross-border co-operation. 
For the future the Commission 
foresees an increased importance in 
the Phare cross-border co-operation 
programme of the activities which 
promote exchanges of experience 
and joint projects on local economic 
development, training and admin-
istration, · although lllfrastructure 
projects will continu~ to account for 
the main part of the budgets. "The 
··< 
* 
* 
* * 
Phare cross-border co-operation programme will become 
increasingly important as an integrated part of the pre-
accession strategy," says a report recently published by the 
Commission. "This reflects the shared desire to build a larger 
family of nations, leading to greater security and prosperity for 
all." • 
Thomas Klau, Brussels 
The Phare cross-border co-operation programme was endowed with 
Ecu 150m in 1994, Ecu 169m in 1995 and Ecu 180m for 1996. The total 
for the period 1994-99 is estimated at about Ecu 900m. 
Cross-border co-operation 
Bulgaria-Greece 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu million (Ecu 115m for 1995-99) 
4 
• Other (10%) 
• Transport (45%) 
• Utilities (10%) 
• Environment (8%) 
LI Economic development (10%) 
D Agriculture (7%) 
D Human resources, public 
administration, cultural 
co-operation (8%) 
D Implementation/management (2%) 
Czech Republic-Gennany 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 125m for 1995-99) 
• Technical assistance (8%) 
• Human resources (2%) 
• Agriculture (2%) 
• Economic development (3%) 
D Environment (33.6%) 
D Transport (34%) 
D Infrastructure and technical 
utilities (17%) 
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Czech Republic-Austria 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 30m for 1995-99) 
• Technical assistance (8%) 
• Human resources (3%) 
• Agriculture (3%) 
• Economic development (10%) 
D Environment (36%) 
D Transport (20%) 
6.0 
D Technical infrastructure (20%) 
Poland-Germany 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 260m for 1995-99) 
• Implementation/management 
(5%) 
• Human resources (4%) 
• Agriculture (3%) 
• Economic development (3%) 
D Utilities (5%) 
143 D Environment (25%) 
D Transport (55%) 
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Slovenia-Italy 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 15m for 1995-99) 
• Programme management (0.5%) 
• Cultural co-operation (4%) 
• Human resources (10%) 
II Economic co-operation (33%) 
D Environment (30%) 
D Transport and cross-border 
infrastructure (18%) 
Estonia 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 15m for 1995-99) 
0.75 • Programme management, 
miscellaneous (5%) 
• Human resources (5%) 
• Transport (30%) 
D Environment (30%) 
D Economic development (30%) 
Latvia 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 15m for 1995-99) 
• Programme management, 
miscellaneous (5%) 
• Human resources (5%) 
• Economic development (10%) 
D Environment (40%) 
D Transport (40%) 
Source: European Commission: Phare Cross-Border Co-operation Programme. 
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Hungary-Austria 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 35m for 1995-99) 
• Small projects fund (4%) 
• Regional planning and 
development (4%) 
• Environment (10%) 
• Human resources (10%) 
D Infrastructure (30%) 
D Economic development (43%) 
Slovakia-Austria 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 13.69m for 1995-99) 
3.2 
• Small project fund, training and 
programme management (15%) 
• Environment (21 %) 
IR Economic development and 
tourism (23%) 
2_83 D Transport and technical 
infrastructure (41 %) 
Slovenia-Austria 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 15m for 1995-99) 
• Technical assistance (7%) 
• Environment (25%) 
• Human resources (4%) 
D Economic development (39%) 
D Infrastructure and transport 
(25%) 
Lithuania 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 20m for 1995-99) 
10 
• Programme management, 
miscellaneous (5%) 
• Environment (20%) 
Ill Utilities (25%) 
D Transport (50%) 
Poland 
Breakdown by programme sector in Ecu m (Ecu 20m for 1995-99) 
• Programme management, 
miscellaneous (5%) 
• Human resources (5%) 
• Transport (15%) 
• Utilities (10%) 
Environment (55%) 
D Economic development (10%) 
5 
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BELGIUM AND FRANCE 
HELP EACH OTHER 
* 
* 
* * 
To encourage cross-border co-operation and economic 
development in the mountainous and economically isolated 
Ardennes region shared between Belgium and France, the 
European Commission recently approved a help programme of Ecu 
28m, 12.45 per cent of which is financed with EU funds with the rest 
of the finance coming from national and local authorities. 
The programme has been set up to help companies and public 
administrations engage in cross-border co-operation. Funding 
goes towards training in traditional local crafts such as carpentry 
and ironwork and to activities focused around preserving the 
environment. 
To enhance the region's attraction as a tourist destination, the 
programme finances the creation of hiking paths as well as various 
tourism and cross-border environment preservation activities. 
An international technical team will be created to help design and 
implement the planned activities. The programme involves the 
department of Ardennes in France and the arrondissements of 
Thuin, Philippeville, Dinant, Neufchateau and Virton in Belgium and 
covers an area with about 700,000 inhabitants. 
WATER IS NO BARRIER TO 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Cross-border co-operation as defined through lnterreg and the EU Phare 
cross-border co-operation programme can stretch across the sea. In 
one of its latest funding decisions, the Commission has unblocked Ecu 
33.68m to improve the infrastructure of southern Corsica and the 
northern Sardinian province of Sassari. 
Global spending will add Ecu 39.29m coming from France and Italy and 
Ecu 1.2m being provided by private investors. The work will focus on 
easing access to the three ports of Porto Torres, Palau and Bonifaccio. 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 
ATTRACT FUNDING 
Regional co-operation projects between Bulgaria and Greece are 
being funded with Ecu 115m for the period 1995-99. One of the 
concrete projects is an improvement of the water supply system of 
Madan and Rudozem. 
At present, the towns of Madan, Rudozem and Smollyan and 34 
other villages in the Rhodopy region in south-east Bulgaria have a 
water supply of only two hours a day. Despite this, Smollyan is the 
biggest winter tourist centre in Bulgaria, with the number of visitors 
swelling up to 160,000 a year. 
This EU Phare cross-border co-operation programme project will 
provide a continuous water supply and involves the construction of 
water intakes on the lskrezka River, a storage reservoir, a water 
purification plant and pipelines to Madan and Smolyan. 
The aim of the project is to improve the health situation, create 
employment, better conditions for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and tourism and help contacts between Greece and 
Bulgaria. The cost is Ecu 9m. 
RICH REGIONS ALSO 
BENEFIT FROM INTERREG 
lnterreg funding is not restricted to economically weak regions alone. 
Cross-border co-operation between Germany's wealthy southern land 
of Bavaria and the neighbouring provinces in Austria (upper Austria, 
Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg) is co-financed by the European 
Commission to the tune of Ecu 24.6m, with Germany and Austria each 
putting up Ecu 5.1 m and private investors providing the remaining Ecu 
5.1m. 
The funding involves a huge range of activities, ranging from 
environment, transport, infrastructure equipment, economic 
development to agriculture, forestry, training and employment. 
Among the concrete objectives pursued are the improvement of 
transport links between the different border regions, the implementation 
of cross-border tourist marketing programmes and the strengthening of 
cross-border links through cultural and scientific co-operation. 
Financing will be extended to common used-water evacuation and 
treatment projects as well as to systematic surveillance of areas under 
an ecological threat. 
The dozens of projects under consideration include a communal 
transport system shared between Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, a 
cross-border information exchange centre and a transport network in 
the protected Karwendel area, a shared pricing system for skiing lifts, 
common media training programmes as well as a common cross-border 
programme for holidays on a farm. 
EAST-WEST PROJECTS 
ATTRACTS EU FUNDS 
The Swiecko freight terminal on the Polish-German border is situated 
on the main east-west communicating road linking Paris, Brussels, 
Berlin, Warsaw, Minsk and Moscow and was opened in July 1995. 
The terminal, the largest in Europe, cost over Ecu 40m to build, of 
which Ecu 5.5m was contributed by the EU Phare programme. Prior 
to its opening truck queues were tailing back over 5 km. When 
Swiecko is fully operational, it will process about 4,000 trucks a day. 
EU HELPS TO TACKLE 
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM 
IN THE BALTIC REGION 
Two separate projects, one in Estonia and the other in Latvia, aim to 
tackle the problems caused by hazardous waste in the Baltic Sea 
region. At present Estonia lacks proper handling and treatment 
systems. 
Specific measures to improve the situation include the establishment 
of four collection and transfer stations for the waste, including 
temporary storage facilities in two locations and a safe landfill site. 
In Latvia the Danish government has financed studies demonstrating 
the extent of the problems caused by hazardous waste. EU cross-
border co-operation with Estonia and Latvia is being funded with Ecu 
30m for the period 1995-99. • 
Reports by Thomas Klau, Brussels 
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0 ver the last seven years Europe's defence industry has experienced hard 
---•times. With the end of 
east-west tension, the massive, 
conventionally-armed stand-off at the 
centre of Europe has dissolved and cold 
war levels of defence spending are no 
longer considered necessary or 
justifiable. 
Defence spending among the 15 
European Union (EU) countries fell by 
about $24bn (Ecu 20.lbn) in 1993 values 
between 1985-94 - a reduction of about 
12.5 per cent, according to the 
International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London. Savings have been 
made across the board. 
Armed forces have reduced their 
manpower and in some cases have 
abandoned conscription. Training 
budgets have been cut and overseas 
bases recalled. The procurement 
of weapons, military 
equipment and 
stores has redu-
ced consider-
ably and the 
funding of de-
fence-related 
research and 
development 
has also felt the 
defence 
companies 
have been trying 
to re-configure 
themselves and 
remain afloat. One response 
has been to reduce the 
labour force. According to 
a January 1996 study by 
the European Com-
mission, defence industrial employment 
( direct and indirect) has fallen since 
1984 by 37 per cent from 1.6m to lm. 
Although cutting staff brings some 
EU governments favouring a free 
market, non-interventionist approach to 
defence industry and its adaptation 
argued that the healthiest way to adjust 
was to allow the market to 
EU defence companies have been trying to re-configure take its course ( closures 
and mergers). For central 
Europe and the Baltic 
states, weapons and mili-
tary equipment were 
marketable, export-earn-
ing commodities. The 
themselves and remain afloat. One response has been to reduce 
the labour force. According to a January 1996 study by the 
European Commission, defence industrial employment (direct and 
indirect) has fallen since 1984 by 37 per cent from 1.6m to 1 m. 
savings, it is at best a short-term 
response addressing only the symptoms, 
rather than the structural causes of the 
problem. 
The current industrial crisis is simply 
caused by over capacity: EU defence 
manufacturing capacity is far in excess of 
what customers might need, either 
nationally or regionally. West European 
defence manufacturing, compared with 
US competitors, has at its disposal an 
overall procurement budget of only 
about half the size in all major sectors, 
including armoured vehicles, warships 
and fighter aircraft. The result is that US 
manufacturers, even if they look no 
further than their domestic market, can 
enjoy significant economies of scale not 
presently achievable in Europe. 
Various strategies to deal with this over-
capacity have been suggested. In the 
early 1990s the idea of converting 
manufacturing plants from military to 
civilian production (making television 
sets in a defence electronics factory) was 
widely discussed but soon seen not to be 
a cure-all. 
result is that defence 
conversion programmes have met with 
little success, but some interest remains 
in the idea. 
The various options which have been 
considered in recent years all point in 
one direction: the uncompetitive nature 
of Europe's defence manufacturing base 
needs to be tackled by consolidation and 
rationalisation. But confronting this 
approach are the weaknesses, frustra-
tions and peculiarities of defence 
manufacturing in Europe. To talk of EU 
defence procurement and manufac-
turing assumes a degree of coherence, 
direction and unity which does not yet 
exist and which could take years to 
develop. 
The EU member states contain many 
separate defence sectors, organised and 
oriented according to national 
preferences and industrial practices. 
There is a vast army of prime and sub-
contractors, and a complex set of intra-
and extra-European co-operative 
ventures. Some sectors have weathered 
the end of the cold war better than 
others, but all are in a state of flux and 
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are experiencing or expecting major 
structural changes. 
National defence sectors have been 
contracting and rationalising steadily 
and there has also been a certain amount 
of industry-led consolidation across the 
EU. Cross-border collaboration comes 
in a variety of forms: 
• strategic alliances such as Eurofighter 
2000 (Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Britain) - the largest such project 
ever undertaken in Europe 
• co-marketing arrangements such as 
that between British Aerospace and 
Saab in Sweden 
• joint ventures such as the Future Tank 
Main Armament alliance between 
French, British and German 
companies to design, build and market 
a new 140mm main armament for 
tanks 
• cross-border mergers such as the 
joining of the helicopter divisions of 
France's Aerospatiale and Germany's 
Daimler-Benz Aerospace to form 
Eurocopter and the merger of the 
missile divisions of Matra of France 
and British Aerospace 
• acquisitions such as those in Britain 
and around Europe by CSF Thomson 
of France. 
Many more industry-led collaboration 
projects are in the pipeline. To 
complement all this industrial activity 
there have been top down efforts by 
organisations such as the Western 
European Armaments Group and the 
Franco-German Armaments Agency 
8 
European Dialogl}e * Defence industry 
* 
* 
* * 
(with Britain about to become a 
member), keeping alive the idea of a 
European armaments agency. 
Given the huge reductions in the 
defence manufacturing labour force 
across the EU, many politicians are 
eager to defend the interests of their 
constituents parochial and 
commercially unwise though this may be 
- and will fight hard to keep jobs. 
With defence industry constrained so 
tightly and viewed largely through 
national prisms, the problem of 
manufacturing over-capacity is 
compounded. Surpluses and ineffi-
ciencies do not automatically prompt 
market-led restructuring, as might be the 
case in other industrial sectors. As long 
as governments resist the discipline of a 
Europe-wide market for national 
reasons, distortions in Europe's defence 
industrial base will persist. These 
distortions will also remain and make 
the overall reduction and rationalisation 
of manufacturing capacity slow and 
difficult, perpetuating competitive 
disadvantage, especially vis a vis US 
competitors. 
The problem of what to do about the EU 
defence industry is as old as the founding 
Treaty of Rome. For some the only way 
out of the dilemma is to modify the 
treaty by deleting Article 223 which 
provides the legal basis for governments 
to be as parochial and protectionist as 
they wish about national defence 
manufacturing. 
But article 223, along with articles 224 
and 225, also makes clear that whatever 
governments do in the name of national 
security, must not damage the common 
market and undermine non-military 
commercial and industrial policies. The 
legal and commercial application of 
article 223 is strictly circumscribed and is 
not quite the escape clause for national 
defence industrial protectionism which 
might be imagined. 
The practical relevance of article 223 is 
defence industry project and a desire not 
to lose national control of a vital 
strategic asset. 
If the political will existed to co-operate 
and integrate in the policy areas of 
common foreign, security and defence, 
then the EU-wide consolidation of the 
defence industry would be much less of 
an issue and would follow relatively 
easily. 
In May 1995 the Brussels-based 
European Defence Industries Group 
(EDIG) published a position paper in 
advance of the Inter-Governmental 
Conference (IGC). Although Europe-
minded defence industrialists might 
have been expected to have a less than 
charitable view of article 223, the paper 
recommended that the clause should be 
maintained "for the moment ... during 
the transitional period leading to the 
establishment of a common European 
defence policy". 
The EDIG comment reflects the 
position of the defence industry. 
Europe's defence manufacturers are 
determined to make the best of what is 
available, consolidating across the EU 
wherever possible. As they do so, their 
industry may become a little more 
competitive in the regional and global 
markets. 
Their governments' scope for protective 
policies under article 223 will de facto 
diminish and the practical relevance of 
article 223 will fade still further away. 
But the relevance and likely fate of 
article 223 is a delicate subject which 
should, preferably, not be discussed. 
If both industry and government can 
agree not to bring the article 223 issue to 
a head, industry will be able to achieve a 
little of the consolidation its seeks and 
certain EU governments, although 
steadily losing control over defence 
manufacturing, will be able to sustain the 
electoral rhetoric of national prerogative 
in matters of security, defence and 
defence manufacturing. 
diminishing in any 
case. Many defence 
companies are al-
ready trans-Euro-
pean and often come 
Defence spending among the 15 European Union (EU) countries fell by 
about Ecu 20.1 bn in 1993 values between 1985-94 - a reduction of 
about 12.5 per cent. 
under EU competition rules when 
manufacturing and exporting dual-use 
and non-military goods. Its retention is a 
manifestation of the reluctance of some 
governments to support a European 
However, the EDIG comment reveals 
how, at the highest levels, the case for 
EU defence industrial consolidation 
begins to rely on visionary politics as 
much as hard-nosed commercial logic. 
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The various national defence sectors have 
three features in common: there are too 
many of them, they are too productive and 
there is massive and heightening 
competition for national, European and 
world markets. 
For industrialists the ultimate prize is a 
genuine EU-wide defence industrial 
. base able to compete realistically with 
the US. The prize is conditional on a 
common European defence policy which 
is still embryonic and may take many 
more years to mature, if ever. 
Defence manufacturers must work 
within the constraints set by 
governments. These constraints are 
loosening to some extent, with cross-
border industrial co-operation and some 
multilateral procurement programmes. 
But to go much further, to begin 
constructing the European defence 
equipment market which the EU 
European Dialogue "'pefence industry 
defence industry needs, will require a 
degree of coherence and common 
purpose among EU government which is 
presently lacking. Industry alone cannot 
force the pace of an issue which is 
central to the post cold war development 
of the EU. 
EU members may have abandoned the 
use of military force against each other, 
but they are still far from combining 
their military forces effectively in the 
pursuit of common goals and without 
US assistance. Common-
ality in purpose and 
execution of security and 
defence policies is the 
necessary antidote to the 
over-capacity and 
fragmentation which 
plagues the EU's 
collection of national 
defence sectors and the 
only conceivable way of 
creating a single customer 
with something like the 
purchasing power of the US Pentagon. 
But commonality in these areas seems as 
unlikely as it is necessary. With their US 
competitors going from strength to 
strength, it is clear that the EU's defence 
industries cannot afford to wait. a 
Paul Cornish, London 
Buying US may help Nato membership but 
hurts European integration 
Defence industrial activity in central Europe and the three Baltic states can be described 
---•on three levels: military, 
industrial and political. The military 
level concerns the acquisition of new or 
updated equipment and weapons. In 
what may at first seem to be contrary to 
the interests of indigenous defence 
industry, there is great interest 
throughout the region in importing 
foreign equipment. 
There is a broad range of requirements 
and acquisition patterns. The former 
Warsaw Pact countries, for example, 
have large stocks of serviceable cold war 
vintage equipment and are not in the 
market for armoured vehicles and the 
like. But they do consider themselves 
lacking in key areas such as combat 
aircraft and command and control 
systems and are looking to buy from 
western and Russian manufacturers. 
For others, such as the Baltic states, it is 
almost a matter of 
Procurement of foreign weapons and military equipment is not as starting from scratch 
as with Estonia's 
purchase of a border 
surveillance system 
straightforward as it may at first seem. In the first place competition for 
contracts is intense, particularly between US and European suppliers. 
Some western analysts estimate this 
market could be worth as much as $15bn 
(Ecu 12.6bn) over the next five years 
and more as these economies continue 
to grow. In some cases procurement 
budgets have been brought forward and 
condensed: Slovenia, for example, could 
spend 10 years' worth of procurement 
budget over the next two or three years. 
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from France's 
Thomson-CSE There are also one-off 
arrangements, such as the US gift of four 
C-130 transport aircraft to Romania. 
Procurement of foreign weapons and 
military equipment is not, however, as 
straightforward as it may at first seem. In 
the first place competition for contracts 
is intense, particularly between US and 
European suppliers. 
The US has begun to take a more 
flexible approach to leasing and selling 
US weapons to central Europe and the 
Baltic states and has developed an arms 
export financing programme similar to 
the systems already in use in Britain, 
France and Germany. There is also a 
good deal of Russian and Israeli interest 
in the central European/Baltic markets. 
To complicate the picture, the buyers are 
motivated not simply by the 
requirement to modernise their armed 
forces, but also by the need to sustain 
and improve their defence industry. 
The defence industry across central 
Europe and the Baltic states is generally 
over-manned and often lacking in 
sophisticated management and 
marketing skills. 
Some national sectors are in a 
particularly bad condition. The Czech 
aerospace industry, for example, a major 
producer during the cold war, is in a state 
of near collapse and the Czech 
government is looking for foreign joint 
venture partners and even outright 
buyers. 
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Slovakia is looking for foreign partners 
for armoured vehicle upgrades and 
aircraft engine development. 
Partnership with foreign manufacturers 
is seen to be the way to resurrect defence 
manufacturing, modernise arsenals, 
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proceeds to buy 100 for their own use. 
After military modernisation and 
industrial survival the defence industry 
has a third element to consider. The 
main defence manufacturers in central 
Europe and the Baltic states all have 
their eye on Nato 
In a buyer's market the 10 applicant countries can insist on 
exacting off-set concessions from any potential weapons supplier. 
Under this they acquire not only the weapons, but also the 
technical/industrial means to make them for the export market. 
membership and it is this 
which arguably is the 
main motivation in 
seeking foreign weapons 
and partners. These 
preserve jobs and begin to earn from 
exports. These considerations often 
determine foreign purchases. 
Central European and Baltic manu-
facturers can offer a highly skilled and 
relatively cheap workforce to potential 
partners. But in spite of these attractions 
some European and US manufacturers 
see risks in teaming with these 
companies. To delay, however, could be 
to lose out. 
With vigorous Russian and Israeli 
competition, especially in aerospace, 
central European and Baltic buyers have 
the initiative in the market place. 
In a buyer's market the 10 applicant 
countries of central Europe and the 
Baltic states can insist on exacting off-set 
concessions from any potential weapons 
supplier. Under this the 10 acquire not 
only the weapons, but also the 
technical/industrial means to make them 
for the export market. 
Poland, for example, does not want 
merely to buy 60 or more combat 
aircraft; it wants to build them in Poland. 
It is also insisting on substantial off-set 
arrangements from prospective 
European, Israeli and US clients for the 
contract to upgrade the PZL-Swidnik 
Huzar combat helicopter, which Poland 
might then sell to the Czech Republic. 
Off-set conditions have become so 
stringent that US industrialists have 
invented a special term - pre-emptive 
off-sets for contracts where 
manufacturing capacity is transferred 
before a sale is even made. A good 
example of this new, strong-arm tactic is 
the joint venture between Romania's 
Intreprinderea Aeronautica Romana 
(IAR) and Bell Helicopters of the US to 
manufacture cobra attack helicopters 
under US State Department licence. 
The plan is for IAR to begin building 
Cobras for export and then use the 
JO 
governments often 
assume, not unreasonably, that by buying 
Nato standard equipment and seeking 
industrial partnerships with Nato 
members, they may improve their 
chances of membership. 
Nato's main interest is not in heavy 
equipment suitable for land warfare, 
which candidate countries have in 
abundance, but in combined air power, 
mobile reaction forces, logistic and fuel 
compatibility and effective command 
and control all leading to the precise and 
controlled use of multinational forces 
in rapid reaction and intervention 
scenarios. 
Nato has recently embarked on a 
far-reaching programme of further 
standardisation in these fields. Anxious 
not to be left behind, candidate countries 
see purchases and industrial teaming 
arrangements as a means of staying with 
developments and keeping their Nato 
candidacy alive. 
For a variety of reasons candidate 
countries are determined to buy foreign 
equipment and forge industrial 
I 
Buyers are motivated not simply by the 
requirement to modernise their armed forces, 
but also by the need to sustain and improve 
their defence industry. 
partnerships. Given their wish to JOm 
Nato, they have a bias towards dealing 
with Nato members. Given that US 
manufacturers have competitive 
advantage over their European 
counterparts, it is possible that the US 
could dominate the defence industrial 
modernisation of central Europe and the 
Baltic states. 
There are a number of reservations to be 
made about this scenario. Although, 
from a military security point of view, it 
may make sense for these countries to 
look towards Nato rather than the EU, 
some would argue that real, long-term 
security for the region lies not so much 
in Nato as in integration into the EU. 
Defence research, development and 
manufacturing are becoming increas-
ingly civilianised. It might be more 
sensible for candidate countries to seek 
collaborative arrangements more 
consistent with eventual EU member-
ship since this is where, in the long-run, 
both their civil industries and the 
civilianised functions of their defence 
industries may be oriented. 
A second reservation is that although 
candidate countries are receiving 
generous aid from the US to integrate 
their air traffic control, air defence and 
surveillance systems, too many bilateral 
procurement and manufacturing ties 
with the US could simply perpetuate the 
industrial fragmentation which existed 
and was fostered in the region during the 
cold war when no country was self-
sufficient in military production. 
Collaboration with the US and purchase 
of US weapons could bring closer the 
prize of Nato membership but could also 
make eventual integration into a 
common European manufacturing base 
- if and when such a thing becomes 
likely - a much more difficult and 
protracted undertaking. 
If the goal of the US is a united and 
militarily capable European partner in 
international affairs, it might be advised 
to forego commercial opportunities in 
the candidate countries and let the 
Europeans get on with it. If central 
Europe and the Baltic states aspire to 
become full EU members, they might be 
advised to forego the kudos of owning a 
fleet of F-16s. • 
Paul Cornish, London 
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Finland's accession to the European Union (EU) was the culmination of a process 
-which began with inde-
pendence from Russia in 1917. After World War II its 
precarious position next to the Soviet Union dominated foreign 
policy. Only with the loosening of Soviet power in Europe and 
its consequent break-up did Finland 's politicians believe it 
possible for the country to join the EU. 
I 
"Often the Community does not exactly know what the real problem is. In 
negotiations you have so much diplomatic language that it can cloud the 
issue." 
This membership had a profound change on both Finland's 
political and economic outlook. "Finland is closer now to 
western Europe. There is a wider range of contacts on all 
levels," says Erkki Liikanen, formerly Finland's ambassador to 
the EU during the accession negotiations and now Budget 
Commissioner. 
Economically Finland was linked to the EU long before 
membership - first through the European Free Trade 
Association (Efta) and then later through the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Both drew the country into the western 
trading group, but did not satisfy the country's political 
ambition to link itself firmly to Europe. 
In late 1990 discussions on EU membership heightened, with 
one question dominating the debate: how to make Finland's 
foreign policy compatible with EU membership. At that time 
agriculture was only a background issue, says Mr Liikanen. 
The Finns applied for membership in March 1992 after Finland 
signed a new treaty with Russia replacing the 1948 treaty of 
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mutual assistance with the USSR which governed Finland's 
relations with its eastern neighbour up to that point. "That 
[ security question] was always important, but the Finns put it in 
such a way that the key question in the EU negotiations was to 
have a safe round-table where decisions are taken. What 
membership gives you is a say on many issues, but of course it 
also gives you obligations, " Mr Liikanen told European 
Dialogue. 
Opinion polls showed that support for Finland 's membership 
among its people was stronger than the case in Sweden and 
Norway. In the October 1994 referendum on EU membership, 
it was clear the Finns were keen to anchor themselves to the 
West (56.9% of them voted for membership). 
A couple of years later, most people still believe EU membership 
is beneficial to the country. "Public opinion remains solid. 
Membership has not created big surprises," says Mr Liikanen. 
"The key point was that food prices went down - by more than 
10 per cent. That was very important for public opinion - what 
was said would happen, was implemented." 
Apart from security considerations, simple economics also help 
to persuade Finns to tick the "yes" box. With the collapse of the 
USSR, Finland's sales to the east dropped even further. At its 
height, trade with the USSR accounted for 25 per cent of total 
exports and in the late 1980s it was averaging 15 per cent. From 
1989 to 1991 it dropped to 5 per cent, coinciding with Finland 's 
deepest recession since the end of World War II. Taken together 
people saw EU membership as a way out of the economic 
doldrums. 
Economically Finland was linked to the EU long before membership -
first through the European Free Trade Association and then later 
through the European Economic Area. Both drew Finland into the 
western trading group, but did not satisfy the country's political 
ambition to link itself firmly to Europe. 
"That is where the 10 new applicant countries have something 
in common with Finland, although they were much more 
dependent on Russian trade [than Finland). Their recession 
lasted from 1991-93, which was due [in part) to this total 
11 
European Dialog~e * Interview 
reorientation of foreign trade. That was what 
happened in Finland on a lesser scale. In Finland 
GDP is higher and Finnish foreign markets 
have been more diversified, 11 says Mr 
Liikanen. 
Although the EEA enabled Finland to 
establish tight economic ties with the 
EU, membership made it possible to get 
closer to its major markets. 11 Of course 
Russia remains important for Finland, 11 
adds Mr Liikanen. 11 When its economy 
starts growing again, it will be an 
important market. 11 
Although political concerns were 
uppermost in the initial approach by Finland 
to the EU, membership negotiations centred on 
agriculture. The EU's common agricultural policy 
(CAP) is bound to be a topic of fierce debate when the 10 
present applicants begin accession talks, even though the 
starting points will be different, predicts Mr Liikanen. 
"When EU agricultural policy was created there were no Arctic 
areas in the Community. That is why new solutions needed to 
be found to guarantee that Finland was also compensated in 
this area," notes Mr Liikanen. 
On the political side, deep rifts appeared within the 
government coalition Centre Party, under pressure by the 
agricultural lobby which did not want to lose their generous 
state subsidies. By maintaining price levels of 25-100 per cent 
higher than the EU, Finland wanted to ensure that its Arctic 
farmers could support themselves. 
"The basic difference in agriculture is that when Finland joined, 
our price levels were higher and the adjustment had to take 
place to a lower level. In the new applicant countries it is the 
other way around. Their price levels must go up, 11 notes Mr 
Liikanen. 
Advice for the new applicant from Mr Liikanen centres around 
research and preparation. "Study first the history of the 
European Community and try to understand the idea of how 
the EU functions. That is important in the negotiations. Then 
try to create a broad expertise at home, in all ministries you 
need experts who have studied all the Community legislation in 
every field," he advises. "Second, it is important to study how 
earlier negotiations took place. There are certain ways in 
12 
which they function and knowing that is 
extremely fruitful." 
Mr Liikanen adds: "The 
difficulty with joining is 
not only accepting 
Community legis-
lation, but knowing 
how to implement 
it, its administration 
and the infra-
structure to apply 
with the Commu-
nity norms." 
Then, as Finnish 
ambassador to the 
EU, Mr Liikanen 's 
* 
* * 
role was to try to explain Brussels to his countrymen 
and II to meet as many people as possible to try 
and explain where the problems lay. This kind 
of background work is very important, 11 he 
advises. 11 Often the Community does not 
exactly know what the real problem is. 
In negotiations you have so much 
diplomatic language that it can cloud 
the issue. 11 
Now as a member of the Commission, 
Mr Liikanen's comments are more 
guarded. "The Commission always tries 
to defend the homogeneity of the 
Community and its legislation, so that there 
are no holes and exceptions. On the other 
hand it tries to find solutions which are acceptable 
for the applicant countries because it is in the interest 
of the Commission that the new countries are not totally 
unhappy with their choice." • 
"Study first the history of the 
European Community and try 
to understand the idea of how 
the EU functions. That is 
important in the negotiations. 
Then try to create a broad 
expertise at home - in all 
ministries you need experts who 
have studied Community 
legislation in every field. " 
Caroline Jacobs, Brussels 
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At the latest by the spring of 1998 - the time to . decide who participates in 
the final stage of EMU by 
January 1 1999 - EU members will have to reach an 
understanding on the currency relationship linking the "ins" 
and "outs ". Three elements will determine the understanding 
reached: the scope defined by the Maastricht Treaty, the likely 
preferences of the "outs " and the common interests of the "ins". 
The treaty is vague in its wording on outsiders. There is a 
presumption that some EMS arrangement will continue for the 
"outs": participation in "normal margins of fluctuations" is 
listed as one of the entry requirements for EMU. Since entry 
was presumed to be a prime ambition for the "outs", the treaty 
drafters did not see the need to be more specific. There are no 
provisions for obliging the "outs" to enter an arrangement, only 
the incentive to do so in order to retain the rights to enter EMU 
if economically qualified. 
The preferences of the likely "outs" will range widely. At one 
extreme if the British government chooses to exercise its right 
not to opt into monetary union initially, it will not be interested 
in any exchange rate arrangements with the "ins". The current 
British preference is to regard a 
like a repetition of the large and rapid currency changes of 1992-
93 and on a lesser scale, 1995. Free-riding by the "outs" on those 
who have joined EMU could mean the end of the single market 
for all EU countries. The general formulation in article 109m of 
the treaty that "each member state shall treat its exchange rate 
as a matter of common interest" is clearly not enough to prevent 
exchange rate misalignments and volatility. 
Since the "ins" cannot oblige the "outs " to enter into a formal 
arrangement, there should be incentives for them to join 
additional to preserving their candidacy for entry. The "outs" 
will be concerned that their initial non-participation in EMU 
would further lower the credibility of their monetary policies. 
merely declaring a central rate against the euro within margins 
so wide that they are unlikely to be tested before they have to 
be given up would not constitute a boost to credibility. To make 
the bargain attractive for the "outs " something firmer may 
have to be offered. 
Unfortunately the logical additional element - foreign 
exchange interventions with a 
tough domestic inflation objective as 
a substitute for participation in 
an EMS-like arrangement. This 
argument is hardly acceptable to the 
"ins" since it could not guarantee that 
misalignments would not arise 
between sterling and the single 
currency. 
The "outs" will be concerned that their initial non- mandatory component for both the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the central banks of the "outs" - has 
Other likely "outs" show less 
reluctance to consider an explicit 
currency link, although Sweden 
shows some sympathy for the British 
position. Spain and Portugal have 
shown a preference for managing 
their currencies inside the EMS. 
Denmark, which has opted out of 
EMU, has indicated that it will seek a 
tight arrangement with the "ins" . 
Italy and Finland may declare a 
central rate in the EMS. 
What should be the response of the 
"ins" ? Their common interest is to 
get some hold on the exchange rates 
of the currencies of the "outs" vis-a-
vis the single currency in order to 
contain misalignments. In particular 
they will be anxious to avoid anything 
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participation in EMU would further lower the credibility of 
their monetary policies. Merely declaring a central rate 
against the euro within margins so wide that they are unlikely 
to be tested before they have to be given up would not 
constitute a boost to credibility. 
a bad reputation since the futile 
attempts in 1992-93 to defend the old 
EMS rates largely by this means. The 
Bundesbank claims that heavy use of 
interventions at that time resulted in a 
significant loss of monetary control in 
Germany. 
But even accepting this argument, one 
that is not well underpinned by 
empirical evidence, two changes will 
have occurred between 1992-93 and 
1999: 
• the degree of asymmetry will be 
much larger between the European 
Central Bank and the individual 
central banks of the "outs" than 
existed between the Bundesbank and 
the smaller central banks; the "outs" 
will have to tailor their interest rate 
policies very closely to that of the 
European Central Bank 
the fluctuation margins will be 
wider than in 1992-93 (though the 
author believes they should be 
13 
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narrowed in 1999), changing the balance in interventions 
further towards those inside the margins. A higher degree of 
discretion is necessarily attached to such interventions. In 
short the "ins" should be generous in offering the "outs" 
mutual support facilities with the European Central Bank in 
order to keep currencies stable while preparing them for 
subsequent entry. 
The case for such bold arrangements is stronger, the closer an 
"out" country is to joining. If there is a firm determination to 
enter, but interest rates remain stubbornly far from those in 
EU members need to reach an understanding on the currency 
relationship linking the "ins" and "outs". Three elements will determine 
the understanding reached: the scope defined by the Maastricht Treaty, 
the likely preferences of the "outs" and the common interests of the 
"ins". 
the monetary union, hence keeping a country on the wrong 
side of one or more of the convergence criteria, there may be 
a case for offering that country associate status. That would 
* 
* 
*• 
mean a fully fixed exchange 
rate with an intervention 
arrangement, but with an 
obligation for the "out" 
to follow country 
European 
Bank 
rigidly 
Central 
policy 
and 
without voting 
rights in the 
European 
Central Bank 
council. Such 
a currency 
board arrang-
ement could generally 
facilitate rapid full entry into 
EMU. • 
Niels Thygesen, Professor of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen and formerly a member of the De/ors 
Committee on EMU 1988-89 
Maastricht criteria vs inflation targets: 
how will ECB resolve the contradiction? 
H ow should the European Central Bank (ECB) operate and how should its monetary policy be co-ordinated with outside countries after the birth of 
---•the euro? Both questions remain open. At the 
Verona meeting it was agreed that a new EMS will link some 
of the outside countries to the euro. But participation in this 
new EMS is optional and some likely outsiders have already 
declared that they do not intend to join. 
The details of how such a system would work remain to be 
decided. Some of the most controversial aspects are whether 
the burden of defending the exchange rate will also fall on the 
For this reason a system of mandatory inflation targets is a 
better answer than any other mechanism. It is a symmetric 
arrangement and one that facilitates holding the European 
Central Bank accountable for its actions. A regime with strict 
and symmetric inflation targets helps solve the problems of 
monetary cohabitation in three distinct ways: 
• it removes the incentive to engage systematically and 
deliberately in competitive devaluations 
• a target regime restores domestic credibility to a low 
inflation policy. This in turn makes monetary cohabitation 
easier because it reduces the volatility of speculative shocks 
European Central Bank, the 
width of the exchange rate band 
Some of the most controversial aspects of EMU are whether the 
to the exchange rate 
• inflation targeting forces monet-
ary policy to respond to shocks in 
a way that stabilises the exchange 
rate. 
· and the procedure for realign-
ments. 
burden of defending the exchange rate will also fall on the 
Consensus on these difficult 
questions will not come easily 
European Central Bank, the width of the exchange rate band and 
the procedure for realignments. 
because there is an unavoidable 
contradiction between the inflation objective given to the 
European Central Bank by the Maastricht Treaty and 
stabilising exchange rates. Fixing any exchange rate is a 
daunting task unless there is unlimited bilateral support by 
both the European Central Bank and outsiders; national 
central banks. But unlimited support by the European 
Central Bank would undermine the credibility of its anti-
inflationary policy and is ruled out by the treaty. 
14 
But how could a European system 
of inflation targets be implemented 
in practice? All EU members would have to participate. They 
would jointly have to announce precise quantitative targets 
for a well-defined measure of inflation, though not necessarily 
the same targets. 
Their inflation performance would be monitored by a 
European institution, most naturally by the European System 
of Central Banks (that is, the European Central Bank plus the 
national central banks not participating in the single 
January-February 1997/1 
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currency). The penalties for missing the target would also be 
recommended by a European institution. For this the most 
natural candidate is the Council of Ministers, since this is the 
only body that comes close to being a European principal for 
the European Central Bank. 
In this respect the arrangement would be similar to the 
11 excessive deficit II procedure described in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Unlike the excessive deficit procedure, however, the 
penalties for missing the announced target would have to fall 
on the central banks, and not on the country involved. A mild 
penalty would be public blame; a harsher penalty would be a 
recommendation to fire the governor, although in this case, 
national legislation may be required to make the sanction 
legal. 
To what extent is a system of generalised inflation targets 
consistent with the Maastricht Treaty? In some ways the 
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A system of mandatory inflation targets is a better answer than any other 
mechanism, It is a symmetric arrangement and one that facilitates holding 
the European Central Bank accountable for, its actions, 
treaty provides a useful underpinning. Except for the opt-out 
countries, central banks are required by the treaty to be 
independent and to pursue price stability as a goal. Inflation 
is one of the convergence criteria and this imposes an implicit 
penalty for the countries that would like to join the euro but 
have excessively high inflation compared to the other EU 
countries. 
The idea of imposing accountability for inflation differences is 
thus already an important ingredient in the treaty. The system 
could be thought of as strengthening some provisions in the 
treaty. It makes inflation convergence an overriding objective 
of monetary policy and it forces each central bank to give that 
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objective operational and quantitative contents and to 
announce them clearly in advance. It also gives institutional 
content to the exercise of accountability by making inflation 
targeting a requirement for all central banks, including the 
European Central Bank and those opting out of the single 
currency, by spelling out more clearly who is responsible for 
hitting the target and by prescribing penalties for poor 
performance. 
The Maastricht Treaty also contains two references to the 
exchange rate. It says the exchange rate is a matter of common 
interest and exchange rate stability (in the sense of no 
realignments) is one of the convergence criteria. But under 
the current EMS, with fluctuation bands of plus or minus 15 
per cent, the exchange rate criterion is almost meaningless. It 
should, therefore, remain meaningless. Any attempt at 
implementing this part of the treaty by giving the exchange 
rate criterion a stricter interpretation should be avoided as 
much as is legally possible. 
Even with a system of generalised inflation targets, the 
exchange rate would remain a matter of common interest. A 
major reason for institutionalising inflation targets at the EU 
level rather than at the national level is precisely because of 
the desirable repercussions for the exchange rate . But 
exchange rate stability ought to be the result of successful 
monetary policies not the explicit target for these policies • 
Torsten Persson, Professor of Economics at the Institute for 
International Economic Studies in Stockholm, and Guido 
Tabellini, Professor of Economics at the Universita Bocconi 
in Milan and director of /GIER, Milan. 
The articles were based on papers first presented at a Centre 
for Economic Policy Research workshop in Rome in February 
1996 hosted by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. They were 
subsequently revised and were first published in a special issue 
by CEPR in June 1996. More infromation from CEPR (fel: (44 
171) 878 2900; Fax: (44 171) 878 2999; E-mail: cepr@cepr.org). 
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European Union transport 
ministers have given a 
mandate to the Commission to 
negotiate air agreements with 
the 10 associated countries. 
The main aim of the accords is 
the eventual creation of a 
common air space between 
the EU and the applicant 
countries. This would include 
full liberalisation of traffic, 
progressive harmonisation on 
air safety, technical, social and 
environmental regulations and 
other EU regulations. Opening 
the markets must, say the 
minister, be part of the 10 
applicants' move to adopt the 
EU's acquis communautaire 
(EU law) in the area of air 
transport. 
Meanwhile, the second struc-
tured dialogue meeting of 
transport ministers discussed 
rail and combined transport 
and transport tariffs. The EU 
members plus the applicant 
countries exchanged views on 
a common strategy for estab-
lishing a transport tariff system 
within the context of a future 
EU enlargement and inte-
gration of the candidate 
countries into the EU's trans-
port system. 
uropea 
Parliament 
wants a greener 
Europe 
The European Parliament 
wants closer co-operation 
between East and West on 
energy and nuclear safety. A 
report by Gordon Adam 
(Labour, Britain) adopted by 
16 
MEPs says both the EU Phare 
and Tacis programmes should 
give a higher priority to these 
areas. The report calls for 
urgent measures to be taken 
on the construction and 
treatment of nuclear matter 
in Ukraine, particularly at 
Chernobyl. The MEPs also 
want to see concrete 
measures adopted to help the 
coal-producing areas of 
central Europe carry out 
needed restructuring. 
Meanwhile the Council of 
European People's Party 
meeting in Vienna last year 
adopted a resolution on the 
next EU enlargement. The 
resolution puts emphasis on 
the need for longer transition 
periods in some cases but that 
this should not lead to a "pick-
and-choose Europe" or bring 
into question the principle of 
equality between member 
states. 
Electronic publishing and 
library networks (DGXIII/E-4) 
is a project which comes 
under the fourth framework 
programme for research and 
technological development 
(formerly known as the 
libraries programme). It runs 
around 50 research pro-
grammes and a number of 
concerted actions and studies 
across the EU. 
The fourth programme has 
now been opened up for 
participation by the 1 O 
candidate countries. Discus-
sions on co-operation 
between EU and candidate 
country libraries, however, 
began in 1994 and since 1995 
there has been an external 
consultant for the unit to 
research the state of library 
development in the 10 
candidate countries, to 
develop a strategy and to 
suggest ways to encourage 
and stimulate closer library 
co-operation across the 
European continent. 
The Commission believes 
efficiently working, modern, 
networked libraries are an 
important tool during the 
economic transition and will 
also help to strength demo-
cracy as well as develop the 
information society in the 
1 O countries. A number of 
events have been organised 
to achieve these aims, 
including a conference on 
library automation (Budapest, 
April 1996 jointly organised 
with the Open Society). 
Studies, the most recent of 
which is an econometric 
survey on library activities in 
the candidate countries, have 
also begun. 
For more information on the 
library programmes and 
networks contact the 
consultant to the project, 
Monika Segbert, lnfopartners, 
4, rue Jos Felten, L-1508 
Luxembourg (Tel: (352) 40116 
2491; Fax: (352) 40116 2330) 
or DGXII I/E-4 Electronic 
Publishing and Libraries, 
Euroforum, rue Alcide de 
Gasperi, L-2920 Luxembourg 
(Tel: (352) 40116 2491; Fax: 
(352) 40116 2330 or the 
project's World-Wide Web 
site at http://www2.echo. 
lu/libraries/en/libraries.html. 
Council of 
Europe 
Croatia became the fortieth 
member of the Council of 
Europe on November 6. 
Membership, first approved in 
April and then delayed over 
misgivings about Croatia 's 
human rights record, was 
granted because of the 
country's co-operation over 
the Bosnian peace accord, 
improvement of human rights 
and a "satisfactory" record of 
co-operation with the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia. 
While the government 
welcomed the Council of 
Europe's decision to admit 
Croatia, others in the 
government took the 
opportunity to voice their 
opposition to the European 
Union's "regional " approach 
on membership. Croatian 
Foreign Minister, Mate Granic, 
said Croatia does not approve 
of the EU's approach to 
membership by countries of 
former Yugoslavia. Mr Granic 
said that making Croatia 's 
entry into the EU conditional 
on an association with the 
countries of south-east Europe 
was unacceptable. Croatia 
wants an individual approach 
which takes "into account the 
level of development and 
democratisation of each of the 
states concerned", Mr Granic 
told his Italian counterpart, 
Lamberto Dini. Messrs Granic 
and Dini were meeting to sign 
a treaty protecting Croatia's 
Italian minority and an accord 
on the promotion and 
protection of bilateral invest-
ments. 
ova 
president 
wants EU 
membership 
Michal Kovac, 
president, told 
Slovakia's 
EU Com-
mission President Jacques 
Santer that internal political 
disagreements should not be 
the only factor in evaluating 
Slovakia's bid for EU 
membership. Mr Kovac says 
the country's macroeconomic 
results, including GDP growth 
of over seven per cent last 
year, are indicators of the 
country 's ability to join the 
club. He also believes the 
West's view of the political 
situation in Slovakia is broadly 
correct and objective and that 
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"the West is criticising the 
same things I myself have 
been criticising". 
Mr Kovac, in Brussels to meet 
both EU and Nato officials, 
reconfirmed that Slovakia 
wants to join both organ-
isations as soon as possible. 
On the question of the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia, 
Mr Kovac said "their rights 
in Slovakia correspond to 
European standards and are 
even greater than them. I will 
not say that there are no 
problems, but the minorities 
can use their language in 
administration." He also 
touched on the concerns over 
the safety of Slovakia's 
nuclear power plants and said 
that because of the current 
economic situation it was not 
possible to close them. 
Pr1ortties o 
information 
society 
Following the Prague meeting 
on the information society in 
September 1996, the EU's 
Industry Council held its 
first meeting with industry 
ministers from the 1 O candidate 
countries under the structured 
dialogue and devoted 
discussions to this subject. 
Ministers discussed an action 
plan of 27 projects launched in 
Prague. The Commission is to 
help the candidate countries 
draw up their national tele-
communications policies prior 
to EU membership. Ministers 
also agreed to ~rganise four 
working groups on specific 
subjects and headed by one of 
the associate countries. The 
third meeting of the Information 
Forum took place in Brussels in 
the autumn. 
Romania's work on its 
preparation for accession was 
reviewed during the EU-
Romania association com-
mittee in October 1996. 
"Preparations for joining the 
Union had not been affected, 
despite the fact that 1996 was 
an electoral year in Romania," 
Romanian officials told the 
committee. 
The Association Committee 
reviewed progress in imple-
menting the pre-accession 
strategy, progress in the 
process of Romania joining the 
Central European Free Trade 
Area (Cefta) and practical 
implementation of the Europe 
agreement. The committee 
noted that there has been a 
marked increase in trade with 
the EU since the signing of the 
agreement. Progress on 
negotiations on agricultural 
goods and processed pro-
ducts were discussed as well 
as import and export 
restrictions on both sides. 
On the topic of visas, the 
Romanian delegation reiterated 
the importance it attaches to 
having its citizens treated the 
same as others from central 
European countries. Bulgaria 
and Romania alone of the 1 O 
candidate countries have visa 
requirements when entering all 
EU countries. 
• An agreement on setting up 
a post-privatisation fund was 
signed. The fund will be 
financed jointly by the EU's 
Phare programme (Ecu 15m) 
and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (Ecu 25m). The fund will 
operate for 1 0 years. 
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The EU has signed its first 
convention on extradition. 
The accord was signed by 
justice ministers and will 
simplify procedures and make 
it easier to extradite those 
involved in organised crime. 
The agreement must now be 
ratified by national parlia-
ments. 
Nato is expected to admit its 
first wave of new members in 
April 1999 - corresponding 
to the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Washington Treaty which 
brought the alliance into 
existence. Robert Hunter, US 
ambassador to Nato, says 
"There's going to be more 
than one round, the doors will 
remain open." 
Scandinavian members of the 
EU are lobbying hard for 
inclusion in the revised 
Maastricht Treaty of a "jobs 
chapter" which would try to 
tackle unemployment in the 
Union. The idea comes from 
the EU summit communique 
of Essen (December 1994) 
and would set out common 
aims and common proce-
dures in labour market policy 
to help young people without 
qualifications, invest in 
training and lower non-wage 
costs; a multi-annual pro-
gramme monitored by the 
Commission and Finance and 
Social Affairs Ministers; and 
creation of an employment 
committee. 
The Commission has begun a 
consultation process on plans 
to decentralise monitoring of 
some competition rules, 
including cartels and price-
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fixing cases to national 
competition authorities. The 
Commission wants individual 
member states' competition 
and judicial authorities to 
make more use of existing 
power to handle such cases. 
The Commission expects to 
present its ideas as a draft 
paper early in 1997. 
The second forum on the 
information society in central 
Europe and the Baltic states 
ended in Prague with a call for 
the 10 applicant countries to 
ensure that an environment 
favourable and positive for 
the development of the 
information society is created, 
to appoint national co-
ordinators to oversee the 
process and to adopt the 
regulatory framework for the 
information society. 
External Affairs Com-
missioner Hans van den 
Broek has proposed a series 
of basic principles to cover 
future contractual relations 
between the EU, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Yugos-
lavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
and Albania. Slovenia, which 
has signed a Europe 
agreement, is not included in 
the Commission proposal. Mr 
van den Broek wants to see 
regional co-operation develop 
and says future agreements 
with these countries will not 
necessarily be identical. 
Overall he wants to see 
respect for an full application 
of the Dayton Peace accord. 
Poland has been granted a 
Ecu 180m loan from the 
European Investment Bank to 
help with the conversion of a 
depleted gas deposits in an 
underground gas storage 
area in Wierchowice, near 
Wroclaw in the western part 
of the country. The loan has 
been granted to the Polish oil 
and gas company, PGNIG, 
and will finance the drilling of 
oil deposits, the installation of 
conduits and construction of 
a gas processing centre as 
well as two gas connections 
to the national gas transport 
network. 
The most recent joint 
parliament committee meet-
ing between MPs from 
Estonia and MEPs ended with 
a call for the rapid accession 
of Estonia into the EU. 
The EU consumer lobby 
BEUC wants to see the EU 
legislate against advertising 
aimed at children, particularly 
on television. The call came 
following a pan-European 
survey on children between 
the ages of six and 12 and 
advertising which showed 
that it was becoming in-
creasingly difficult even for 
adults to distinguish advert-
ising from information. The 
study showed that EU 
regulations had so far failed to 
keep up with increasingly 
sophisticated and often more 
covert marketing techniques, 
says BEUC. 
EU Industry ministers will host 
an international conference to 
discuss ways to prevent the 
misuse of the Internet and 
f ... 
other information networks. 
The ministers want the EU to 
find a common understanding 
on means and conditions 
governing the use of 
global information networks. 
Germany will host the 
conference to be held some 
time in 1997. The meeting will 
also cover subjects ranging 
from copyright piracy to using 
the net to incite terrorism, 
highlight policy questions 
such as how much 
responsibility service provi-
ders should have to police 
illegal content. A position 
paper by Commissioner 
Martin Bangemann, respons-
ible for information techno-
logy and industrial affairs, is 
being prepared and it will 
complement a Green Paper 
on new media services being 
drafted by Commissioner 
Marcelino Oreja, responsible 
for culture and information 
policies. 
Spain is blocking the renewal 
of the European Investment 
Bank's loan guarantees to 
third countries. In 1995 EIB 
News in Brief ... News in Brief ... News in Brief ... News in Brief ... 
lent a total of Ecu 2.25bn to 
third countries of which Ecu 
1 bn went to the 10 candidate 
countries and other parti-
cipants of the EU Phare 
programme. 
Poland's socio-economic 
committee has approved a 
draft language law which says 
labels on commodities and 
shop signs should be in 
Polish. It foresees the 
imposition of fines for 
infringements of the law. The 
draft now needs legislative 
committee approval before 
going to the cabinet for a final 
decision on whether or not to 
send it to parliament. The law 
will replace a 1945 decree 
saying that Polish is the state 
language. Polish language 
experts are worried about the 
frequency of English and 
German words used in 
Poland, mainly in shop signs. 
The cost of living in Bulgaria 
tripled in 1996 mainly due to 
rising prices and high 
inflation, according to a 
survey by the Confederation 
of Independent Trade Unions. 
At the same time the 
country's population has 
decreased by 600,000 over 
the last seven years due to a 
declining birth rate. The 
survey showed a high number 
of children born out of 
wedlock and a changed 
ethnic structure. The survey 
also reported that children 
were putting more emphasis 
on material prosperity, but 
were also increasingly victim-
ised by violence, prostitution, 
drugs and other criminal 
activities. 
Hungary and Austria have 
opened a 117 km natural gas 
pipeline between Gyor, 
Hungary and Baumgarten, 
Austria. This helps decrease 
Hungary's dependence on 
Russian energy sources and 
links it into the west European 
gas network. 
Romania has received a 
$175m (Ecu 147m) loan from 
a consortium of European 
banks. The loan, granted to 
the Romanian National Bank, 
will help the country pay its 
$7bn (Ecu 5.8bn) foreign 
debt while keeping foreign 
currency reserves at a level to 
maintain imports. Last year 
Romania received over 
$1 .4bn in foreign aid and 
loans. 
Defence ministers from 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
have signed joint declarations 
on the development of the 
Baltic Peacekeeping Batta-
lion. They are setting up a 
joint naval unit and creating a 
unified system of control over 
air space. The three are also 
to form a joint task force to 
bring military equipment in 
line with Nato standards. 
US Defence Secretary William 
Perry has assured his Baltic 
counterparts in a letter that 
they are "fully eligible" for 
Nato membership. "I reject -
and the US rejects - any idea 
that the Baltic countries are 
excluded a priori or that any 
non-Nato country has a veto 
over their aspirations -
whether de jure or de facto," 
Mr Perry wrote. 
Eureka Audio-visual has 
launched several initiatives in 
the 1 O candidate countries in 
co-ordination with the 
European Commission in the 
area of regulations and 
actions to support the audio-
visual sector. In future Eureka 
Audio-visual plans to act as 
an intermediary between its 
members and the EU to 
promote co-operation in this 
sector at a European level. A 
convention concluded in 
December 1995 will bring its 
assistance to countries in 
central Europe and the Baltic 
states. The organisation 
is promoting exchanges 
between professionals and 
training. Under the frame-
work of Digimedia, profes-
sionals from Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia as well as Turkey 
and Russia, took part in a 
training sessions on digital 
techniques applied to 
multimedia development and 
interactive television. 
Lithuania's President Algirdas 
Brazauskas during an official 
visit to Brussels in October 
1996 told the European 
Parliament President Klaus 
Haensch that he did not see 
"any serious obstacles that 
would delay the acceptance 
of Lithuania in the Union". He 
told the European Parliament 
committee on foreign affairs 
and the parliament's dele-
gation to the Baltic states that 
"Lithuania meets the EU 
membership criteria estab-
lished in Copenhagen" and 
that his country has made 
significant economic pro-
gress. 
Italy, Hungary and Slovenia 
have agreed to co-ordinate 
regional policy in security, 
transport and a wide range of 
other areas. In a joint 
declaration between the three 
countries signed by foreign 
ministers, the three declared 
that "Europe's future stability 
and development can only be 
based on the final completion 
of the process of European 
and Atlantic integration", 
referring to both EU and Nato 
membership for Hungary and 
Slovenia. On a more concrete 
level, Italy is to concentrate 
on completing a highway 
linking Trieste in north-east 
Italy to Budapest through 
Slovenia. 
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Political statements, financial aid and structured meetings are all ways in which 
-European Union (EU) 
governments are strengthening ties with the 10 applicant 
countries from central Europe and the Baltic states and at the 
same time attempting to strengthen democracy in these 
emerging economies. 
I 
Greens have had to search hard for people capable of forming potential 
environmental parties in the new democracies, but they are now making 
progress in many countries. 
In a far less visible, but constant and effective way, west 
European political parties are also helping the applicants 
integrate into Europe's political structures. Mainstream 
political parties in the EU are regularly meeting their 
counterparts from central Europe and the Baltic states and 
helping to pass on the customs and habits of western party 
politics. In building these links political parties are meeting 
different challenges. 
Socialists in western Europe have been learning how to deal 
with eastern socialism and how to bring former communists into 
the socialist fold. For Christian Democrats, accustomed to a 
virtual desert on the right in the former communist bloc, the 
question is how to transform the new young parties of the right 
into Christian Democrats. The group has formalised its ties with 
sister parties in the 10 applicant countries though the trans-
European group, European People's party (EPP) and the 
European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD). 
Greens have had to search hard for people capable of forming 
potential environmental parties in the new democracies, but 
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they are now making progress in many countries. 
Socialists have had the easiest time. Similar parties in Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Romania are all now members of 
Socialist International. "We've got a normal organic link with 
them, 11 says Robert Vandervotte of the secretariat general of the 
Party of European Socialists (PES), which groups socialist and 
social democratic parties in EU member states. 
The group has 15 observer parties in all 10 applicant states. The 
party statute emphasises that it has a role in outreach work, 
bringing candidate country parties into the larger European 
grouping. At the party's twice-yearly congresses, contacts are 
made. "We test ideas in party conferences and that has helped 
a lot to cement links between local parties," says Mr 
Vandervotte. 
Contacts are not only made at party congresses, but cemented in 
between meetings at working groups. "They have become a 
normal part of the PES, 11 adds Mr Vandervotte. 
For many eastern socialists, Germany's SPD has become a role 
model. "When they wrote the SPD party programme, they had 
to start from zero," says Mr Vandervotte. "They have become a 
real example." 
West European socialists are now working with many members 
of former communist parties. One new ally is Hungary's Prime 
Minister Gyula Hom. Foreign minister under Hungary's last 
communist government, he has led the transformation of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party and made it a member of Socialist 
International. 
Mainstream political parties in the EU are regularly meeting their 
counterparts from central Europe and the Baltic states and helping to 
pass on the customs and habits of western party politics. In building 
these links, political parties are meeting different challenges. 
In Poland western socialists work with two parties, the Labour 
Union, the progressive, left wing of the trade union movement 
Solidarnosc, and the Social Democratic Party, formerly the 
communist party, which Polish President Alexander 
Kwasniewski led to power in the last elections. 
Some countries, however, have remained relatively isolated 
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from the west European mainstream. For example, the 
. Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), formerly the communist party, 
has not linked with any western socialists. 
While links between local parties are expanding, the contacts 
are mainly on an individual basis between politicians and party 
workers and have not yet reached the real grass roots, according 
to Mr Vandervotte. He says socialist militants often have the 
same problem of reaching the general public in western Europe. 
In the 10 applicant countries, however, the problem of recruiting 
people to new political parties is greater. The public is wary of 
any party which smacks of the communist days and any well-
organised structure is often suspect for that reason alone. 
Liberals in the EU tell another story. They are joined together 
in the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform 
(ELDR) group. Although they have similar ties with 
* 
While links 
In Germany the federal government supports a series of 
foundations, all linked to political parties, but financed from the 
federal budget. One of these foundations is linked to the 
German liberal party. "You can find a representative of the 
German liberal foundation in most central European and Baltic 
countries," says Christian Ehlers of the ELDR secretariat 
general. 
West European liberals recently travelled to Romania to 
support their counterparts during the country's November 1996 
parliamentary elections. In 1995 they worked to get Romania's 
three liberal parties to join hands before the elections in order 
to win parliamentary seats. That happened also in May, with the 
formation of the Liberal Alliance. Western liberals are trying to 
convince the parties in Bulgaria to join together in order to be a 
more powerful and effective political force. 
In countries where there is no established liberal party, such as 
Poland, ELDR sends members to search for potential partners. 
Environmental parties are less open about their "hunting" 
activities in central Europe and the Baltic states. Although the 
Green parties follow the traditions of west European political 
movements, springing up as a popular movement, they are less 
developed in party organisation, being relatively new and 
having limited experience of working within elected 
governments. 
"We should not go in [to these countries] and try to organise 
things," says Ralf Moeno of the European Federation of Green 
Parties. "Greens in the West have developed from their own 
initiatives nd it should be the same in the East." 
But western Greens do support the emerging environmental 
parties in the applicant states. The federation conducts a regular 
dialogue with these parties. Dutch and Swedish members are 
the most active. 
their counterparts in the applicant states, they have 
only affiliate members from among the liberal 
parties in central Europe and the Baltic states. 
These new parties can participate in debates, 
but they do not have the right to vote at party 
congresses. After two years of affiliate 
membership, a party can apply for full 
membership. 
between local parties are 
expanding, the contacts are mainly 
In many applicant countries, environmental parties 
are struggling to gain political credibility and 
influence. After 1989 Green parties, often 
associated with the dissident movements under 
on an individual basis between 
the communist regime, gained prominence in 
some central European and Baltic states. West 
European Green parties have helped them draft politicians and party workers and 
proposals for environmental legislation. 
have not yet reached the real 
Prior to independence Swedish Greens helped 
Lithuania keep a link to the outside world. Sweden 's 
Green Forum is now channelling funds to the Baltic 
states and in Estonia helped form the environmental party. 
Central European and Baltic state liberals attend 
ELDR's yearly congress where top decisions are made as 
well as three or four council meetings of party representatives 
each year. Other gatherings include a yearly conference. 
grass roots. 
Among the 10 candidate countries there are liberal parties in 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. When a liberal party from one of the applicant states 
needs help in launching a political campaign, organising local 
party militants or fund raising, ELDR can help, putting it in 
touch with a liberal party in an EU country that can send a party 
organiser to help with the local campaign. Most prominent in 
helping colleagues in central Europe and the Baltic states are 
party workers from Germany, Britain, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
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Dutch and German Greens also have a special foundation 
which helps to develop links with similar movements in the 
applicant states. • 
Bartholomew Dandridge, Brussels 
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EUROPE'S POLITICAL PARTIES BEGIN TO CROSS 
THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE 
The European Parliament is also playing its part in fostering Romania and Slovakia. The result of this activity was a formal 
democracy in the applicant states and in helping support new declaration by the European Council meeting in Florence that "the 
political parties emerging in the 10 countries. The political groups parliamentary committees are an integral part of the institutional 
inside the European Parliament first established informal contacts 
with the 1 O candidate countries in the 1970s. Although the EU 
and the former Comecon (the Soviet-inspired and led answer 
to the European Community) had no official links, MEPs 
drafted reports anctpassed resolutions on the political, 
economic and human rights issues in what are now the 
10 candidate countries. 
The European Parliament formalised its contacts with 
the what are riow the 10 applicant countries in 1982, 
each other, relations became official. 
associated countries to exchange views on the most 
important aspects of bilateral relations and to improve 
mutual acquaintance and understanding". In addition 
three meetings have been held between the presidents 
of the applicant country parliaments and the president of 
the European Parliament. 
Increasingly frequent contact with their European 
Parliament counterparts on an expanding range of 
subjects has given parliamentarians and politicians in 
the applicant states an essential political tool -
knowledge of their government's policies. 
"The committees take the monopoly of 
information out of the hands of the 
There are now six inter-parliamentary 
delegations which oversee the European 
Parliament's relations with south-east Europe 
(a loose geographical term which includes the 
former Yugoslav states, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Turkey), the Transcaucasus, Ukraine-
Belarus-Moldova, the three Baltic states, fostering democracy in the applicant states and in I 
The European Parliament is playing its part in 
government," explains Geoffrey Harris in the 
European Parliament's secretariat. Because 
JPCs are part of the enlargement process, 
they receive information from the European 
Commission and Council of Ministers as well 
as from governments of the associated Russia · and Central Asia-Mongolia and helping support new political parties emerging in 
the JO countries. Slovenia. In addition there are joint countries. Through their participation in 
JPCs, the parliamentarians from the candidate countries are able to parliamentary committees (known as JPCs) which handle relations 
with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Joint parliamentary committees will be created with 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia when the Europe 
receive inform.ation from their governments. Parliamentarians in 
opposition parties are equally privy to the information. 
Armed with knowledge the JPCs can make recommendations to the 
agreements have been ratified. authorities of both the applicant countries and EU governments. A 
Inter-parliamentary delegations, composed of 10-20 MEPs elected JPC resolution can be circulated in the 10 candidate countries' 
by their peers, hold meetings regularly and 
work together before these meetings to set an 
agenda and discuss issues, such as political 
and· economic transition, environmental and 
social concerns, minority issues and regional 
co-operation. At the meetings both sides can 
evaluate progress" on the EU Phare 
programme. 
The joint parliamentary committees monitor 
the progress and functioning of the Europe 
agreements. The co,-nmittees, each of which 
meet twice a year, are provided for in the 
The joint parliamentary committees monitor 
the progress and functioning of the Europe 
agreements. The committees are provided for 
in the Europe agreements and are 
complemented by parliamentary standing . 
committees on transport, industry, trade, fiscal 
policy, foreign policy and other sectors where 
the 10 applicant countrie; will have to bring 
Europe agreements and are complemented 
their policies into line with the EU. 
by parliamentary standing committees on 
parliaments. 
Another plus for the committee is its media 
coverage. JPC meetings held in an 
association country usually attracts wide 
press coverage as well as the interest of the 
government's top ministers. 
JPC members have another way to exert 
pressure on governments outside their own 
national parliaments. The JPCs, Mr Harris 
says, "provide a useful forum for mutual 
education and an attempt at the joint 
exercise of parliamentary control over the 
work of governments". 
MEPs can, he says, "play a very important 
transport, industry, ,trade, fiscal policy, foreign policy and other 
sectors where .. the · 10 applicant countries will have to bring their 
policies into line with the EU. 
role in encouraging parliamentarians in newly established 
In the first half of 1996, joint parliamentary committees held 
meetings with Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
democracies not always to assume that their executives are in the 
right and Brussels is always wrong. MEPs can encourage their 
opposite numbers to do just what they do: question the 
commission, insist on full information, check on waste." 
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EU members of committees and inter-parliamentary delegations run 
the same risk as western political parties do when they get i'nvolved 
in issues in the candidate countries - both could be accused of 
. meddling in national politics. 
"MEPs have not hesitated to raise issues which annoy their 
partners, such as barriers to investment in Poland or violations of 
the normal practices of a democratic civil' society in Slovakia and 
minority rights in Romania, 11 says Mr Harris. 
When they .do, MEPs generally defend themselves, taking the moral 
high ground as a member of a more advanced democracy. They 
also feel free to use the argument that if they are worried about an 
issue in the candidate country, the EU will also be discussing that 
issue when membership negotiations begin. 
* 
* 
* 
that country, the Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar attended a 
televised session with the JPC, answerin~ their questions. 
In some situations the close contact between the European 
Parliam,,ent and applicant countries can mean an issue is dealt with 
even before MEPs can take their criticism to the country's leaders. 
In September 1996 MEPs tabled an urgency resolution on 
homosexual rights in Romania. To convince MEPs not to debate the 
issue, Romanian officials said they would discuss gay rights at the 
.next JPC. 
"The committees are breaking down traditional diplomacy," Mr 
Harris remarks. "They are getting used to arguing things out in the 
open", adding that statements are often more blunt from MEPs. 
Committee members are getting to know each other and that 
Often, rather than turn its back on the criticism, . the candidate familiarity is rea~ing rewards. • 
country takes on the issue. For example, in November 1995 when a 
JPC convened in Slovakia only a few days after the European 
Parliament voted a resolution criticising undemocratic practices in Bartholomew Dandridge, Brussels 
Emerging democracies display similar 
trends 
What distinguishes political parties in central Europe and the Baltic states from their counterparts in western Europe? The simple answer is the decades 
----since the end of World War II. During that time the 
10 candidate countries from the region had a communist party 
structure imposed on them and there was little or no 
opportunity for opposition parties to develop. Instead there 
were attempts by dissident groups to move towards more 
democracy. After 1989 these groups to a greater or larger extent 
began to form into political parties or groupings. 
One common feature was that some of these countries had the 
remnants of a disgraced communist party which either 
reformed itself, and in the process chose a new name, aligned 
itself more to the social democratic movement, but did retain 
members 
party structure. That is 
one reason why reformed 
communist parties have been 
able to make an electoral come-back. Voters, disillusioned with 
new parties which in many cases promised too much too 
quickly, turned back to the left-ward leaning parties which in 
their turn promised more help for those suffering from the 
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economic transition. These reformed communist parties were 
also usually staffed with people who had more experience of 
wielding power and who, in some cases, were seen to be more 
efficient and effective within government than the newly 
formed democratic parties. 
In all these emerging democracies there has been a 
proliferation of parties and over the next few years 
consolidation and mergers are expected to dominate the 
political scene in many countries. While a stable political 
environment has not been the norm throughout the region, 
political stability is beginning to become a feature of some 
country's political scene. 
Three countries which display collectively all these trends and 
characteristics are Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Poland's large and active dissident movement during the last 
two decades laid the foundation stones for democracy, but have 
also led to political instability. 
"My impression is that we have a modern party structure in the 
sense of western political party 
structures only on the left of 
the political spectrum 
23 
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dominated by the post- or ex-communist party which has 
retained some of the former party's financial resources and 
structure, as well as personnel. It has partly succeeded in 
continuing to function as a party and has taken a modern 
approach to elections. "It has a professional approach to the 
elections, " observes Mr Freudenstein. 
But the centre-right parties neither had an old structure to 
support them nor were they able to build up a party structures 
comparable to those in western Europe. Mr Freudenstein 
believes more professionalism is needed. "This is the situation 
in Poland because of the specific politics of the last two decades 
where the people of the centre-right parties were mostly 
opposition intellectuals or from the workers opposition of the 
1980s. They never really took into account the fact 
* 
* 
* * 
In western Europe we have a definite decline in party politics 
with parties turning more into think tanks which come up with 
strategies which are professionally sold to voters. The days 
when political parties reflected the mood of society may be 
ending. Poland's political scene may also eventually change to 
this. Maybe over the next 10 years we will meet mid-way," 
concludes Mr Freudenstein. 
In contrast to the political upheavals in Poland, the Czech 
Republic has been a model of political stability and looks set to 
continue that path well into the next century. 
"The situation in the Czech Republic is completely opposite [to 
that in Poland]. Here there is political stability and party 
structures which are almost identical to those found in western 
Europe, despite the problems and repression of the communist 
era," says Reinhard Stuth , director of the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung in Prague. "After the last parliamentary election, I can 
say the Czech Republic is the only central European country to 
have an entirely west European party structure. 
that they would see power in their lifetime -
not an unnatural approach - and they 
have an over-moralised approach to 
The Czechs are 
There is a stabilised number of parties - six 
now in parliament and all of these 
parties were in the last parliament extremely realistic and pragmatic. At the 1992 
politics. They do not want power 
for its own sake but set an agenda elections the ODS did not promise too much. It said it would 
although several from the last 
parliament did not make the five 
per cent minimum threshold. This 
is a clear signal of the stability." 
and if that is realised , they step 
down. No one says, 'look, I'm so 
good I should be ruling the country '. 
This would be a healthy approach. 
work towards a market economy and that there would be some 
improvements, but not quick changes. So the voters were 
In the Czech Republic there is one 
major centre-right party, the ODS, led by not disappointed. 
Power remains immoral to these people and 
they are not prepared for the type of politics which 
characterise a modern Poland now," explains Mr Freudenstein. 
The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is an independent group and, 
like other similar organisations, is paid for by the federal 
government. It is affiliated to one political party. "In our case, 
it is the Christian Democratic Union," says Mr Freudenstein, 
adding, "We are not formally dependent on the party and you 
don't have to be a member of it. However, I am a member of 
the CDU and have been active in local and youth organisations. 
In Poland we work most closely with the Freedom Union which 
is made up of these intellectual types. Internally it has a wide 
spectrum of people ranging from Christian Democrats to 
market liberals to those with tendencies close to the Social 
Democrat movement. The party is made up of the political 
figures who dominated the Polish political scene four years 
after 1989. They lost power in 1993 and since then the party's 
popularity has been shrinking. We try to work with them, to 
put in know-how about election campaigning. We explain how 
to make a strategy, but we do not give any financial support. 
The formal link between the German CDU party and the 
Polish party is through membership in the trans-European 
organisation, EDU which has a wide range of members from 
countries both in and outside the European Union." 
Mr Freudenstein does not expect Poland's political scene to 
resemble that in western Europe for at least a decade. "For a 
very long time - probably another 10 years at least - I do not 
see a party structure as in western Europe appearing in Poland. 
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Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. "This party is to 
the right, but not too much to the right," explains Mr 
Stuth, adding, "On the other hand the centre-left party, led by the 
president of parliament, is to the left, but not too left. They are 
really Social Democrats, having around 26 per cent of the votes. 
There are two smaller parties in the middle, more like Christian 
Democrats." 
One of these smaller parties is the KDU/CSL, with strong 
support in Moravia and among Catholic voters. It has a 
' 
In all these emerging democracies there has been a proliferation of parties 
and over the next few years consolidation and mergers are expected to 
dominate the political scene in many countries. 
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relatively stable voter base, but Mr Stuth expects this to 
increase in future. The ODA, led by former dissidents, is most 
closely associated with the Czech president, Vaclav Havel, 
although he does not belong to any one party. "I expect the 
Voters, disillusioned with new parties which in many cases promised 
too much too quickly, turned back to the left leaning parties which in 
their turn promised more help for those suffering from the economic 
transition. 
ODA to merge eventually with some people going to the ODS 
and others to the KDU/CSL," forecasts Mr Stuth. 
There are also two extreme parties, one on the right, the 
Republicans, and one on the left, Communists, made up of 
former party members who have no regrets about the past. 
"We had no splitting of any party in parliament over the last 
couple of years, unlike the rest of central Europe. We had 
mergers - very similar Christian Democratic movements 
merged with the ODS or the KDU/CSL," says Mr Stuth. 
"All the Czech parties are working to achieve a full party 
structure. There is a more lively internal party life here. This is 
shown particularly by the ODS. At its party congress in 
December 1996 the debates focused substantially on strategy," 
observes Mr Stuth. The main political parties in the Czech 
Republic also have a well-developed local branch network 
throughout the country. 
But why was the Czech Republic able to achieve stable party 
structures so quickly? "There are no true answers, only 
guesses," says Mr Stuth. "The first thing is that the Czechs are 
extremely realistic and pragmatic. At the 1992 elections the 
ODS did not promise too much. It said it would work towards 
a market economy and that there would be some 
improvements, but not quick changes. So the voters were not 
disappointed." 
Another important element, believes Mr Stuth, is the Czech 
population's tendency to look westwards. "They are more west 
European than the Austrians, not in party structures, but in 
mind-set. No one in the Czech Republic is interested in what 
happens in Slovakia or Poland. They are interested in what is 
happening in Germany, Britain and the US." 
A good example of this, says Mr Stuth, was the Czech reaction 
to the German CDU 1995 party programme, a long-term 
strategy document which has been translated into Czech. "We 
receive requests to arrange conferences and seminars about 
this programme, and these talks are on such subjects of 
subsidiarity, the basic principles of the economy and social 
welfare versus market economics. This would not happen so 
fast in the other countries," concludes Mr Stuth. 
But across the border, the situation is very different. Slovakia 
has an uncertain political life but has been able to maintain a 
strong economic performance during the transition to a market 
economy. 
"At the other end of the rainbow is the Slovak Republic. It 
could not be farther away from the party political structures of 
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the Czech Republic," says Mr Stuth who is also director of the 
Bratislava office of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 
Why the difference? Mr Stuth believes part of the answer lies 
in history. "These two countries have only rarely and recently 
been put together as one country in an historical dimension. It 
is normal for them to be separate. Only for a few decades after 
World War I and II were they together." Another reason could 
be the early and extensive industrial development of the Czech 
Republic. "It was one of the first countries in the world to be 
industrialised. It had the first industrial fair in Prague in 1791. 
Germany has a strong influence on its development. At the end 
of World War II there were around 3.5m Germans in the 
country, almost all of them in Bohemia and Moravia, before 
they were expelled. The Czech Republic has a different 
population structure, made up of Czechs, Germans and Jews. 
But Slovakia has only a Hungarian minority," says Mr Stuth. 
Slovakia was never "independent" until now, points out Mr 
Stuth, and it is more of a rural society. "The party structures in 
Slovakia are still evolving and are in a premature stage of 
consolidation. HZDS, the movement led by Prime Minister 
Vladimir Meciar, is not a political party and I doubt it will be 
able to exist once Mr Meciar is no longer in power. It is more 
a vehicle for Mr Meciar," explains Mr Stuth. 
All the other Slovak parties have 13 per cent or le~s of the 
votes. The most established of these is the Christian 
Democratic party with 12-14 per cent of votes. It has a 
comprehensive programme and a network of local offices. The 
post-communist SDL has around 10 per cent of the votes and 
might survive, says Mr Stuth, but he expects it to move more in 
the direction of a social democratic party. Mr Stuth, one of the 
many observers of the Slovak political scene, believes, "The 
other parties may disappear with the exception of the party for 
the Hungarian minority. But these developments will be in the 
future. At present the political scene is similar to that in other 
central European countries." • 
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After four years of steady improvement, average economic growth in the 10 associated central European countries was somewhat lower in 1996 than in the 
previous year. 
While domestic demand and imports remain strong, the 
economic slowdown in western Europe is reducing exports, which 
has a negative effect on the current account position. 
Additionally, in several countries growth is affected by serious 
disruptions in the stabilisation process. 
Nevertheless, at an average of four per cent, GDP growth 
remains satisfactory and it is foreseen that in 1997 and 1998 
economic developments will accelerate somewhat again, as a 
result of the expected economic recovery in the European Union 
(EU). 
The gradual dis-inflation process is continuing in most countries, 
with the notable exception of Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent 
Romania. 
Despite sustained high real wage growth, it can be expected that 
inflationary pressures will ease further in the coming years, 
thanks to productivity improvements. 
The slowdown of economic growth in 1996 will probably be more 
pronounced than foreseen in the Commission's spring forecast. It 
is now expected that average growth in 1996 will remain limited 
to four per cent, which is still considerably higher than in the EU 
member states. Because it decreases the demand for exports, the 
sluggish economic growth in western Europe, and more 
specifically in Germany, the main trading partner for most of the 
10 applicant states, is one of the determining factors for the lower 
growth in central Europe. 
Only the Czech Republic has been able to expand its exports to 
other regions sufficiently to offset the slower exports to the EU. 
Meanwhile, investment is soaring and private 
consumption remains 
buoyant, supported by 
considerable real wage increases. Consequently, imports of 
consumption and investment goods continue to increase at a fast 
pace, and the trade deficit is expected to rise. 
Besides external factors, average growth in central Europe is also 
influenced by the specific situation in a number of countries. 
Hungary is still implementing restrictive policies to overcome its 
1995 budget and current account deficits. Lithuania suffered 
from the consequences of a banking crisis. 
Bulgaria is experiencing serious balance of payments problems, 
combined with an exchange rate crisis which pushed up inflation 
and the budget deficit. 
Although domestic demand should remain the main contributor 
to growth in 1997 and 1998, the high growth rates that have been 
observed in recent years will probably not be repeated to the 
same extent. 
On the other hand exports will be able to recapture some of their 
lost growth dynamics, as a result of the expected acceleration of 
economic developments in the EU. The high capital formation in 
previous years should also start to have positive effects on 
productivity, and consequently improve competitively. 
As a result average GDP growth is forecast to speed up 
somewhat to 4.5 per cent in 1997 and 4.75 per cent in 1998. It is 
expected that all countries will record positive growth in 1998, 
mainly because of the relatively optimistic forecast for Bulgaria, 
which rests on the assumption that the government's stabilisation 
programme will be largely successful. 
In all countries with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, 
average annual inflation was brought down below 25 per cent in 
1996. In Hungary the restrictive policies that were introduced in 
1995 also managed to curb rising inflation again. It is expected 
that all these countries will be able to reduce inflation below 15 
per cent in 1998, as a result of continued prudent 
macroeconomic polices and smaller inflationary effects of 
relative price changes, because this process is almost 
completed. 
The expected continued rapid growth of real wages 
should not jeopardise the reduction of inflation, 
because it would be largely offset by further 
productivity increases. If stabilisation policies in 
Bulgaria are successful, inflation could fall from this 
year's expected 110 per cent to 100 per cent in 1997. 
Because of statistical carry-over effects, this 
apparently small decline is in fact hiding a sharp 
reduction to an end of year annual inflation rate in 
1997 of 30 per cent. In Romania the higher than 
expected inflation in 1996 is mainly the result of 
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monetary policy slippages. 
In most countries unemployment rates are now declining 
gradually from the high levels that were reached in the early 
years of transition. This positive evolution is the result of a 
continued decline in (mainly female) labour market 
participation, combined with a stabilisation of small positive 
growth of employment. If economic growth develops as 
expected, a continuation of the downward tendency of 
unemployment can be expected. 
Again, Bulgaria might be the negative exception, because of the 
sharp contraction it is experiencing now. On the other hand 
labour market conditions in the Czech Republic continue to be a 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
(real percentage change) 
1994 
Bulgaria 1.4 
Czech Republic 2.6 
Estonia -2.7 
Hungary 2.9 
Latvia 1.9 
Lithuania 1.0 
Poland 5.2 
Romania 3.9 
Slovakia 4.9 
Slovenia 4.9 
Total of 10 4.0 
Inflation 
(private consumption deflator) 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Estonia* 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania* 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Total of 10 
*GDP deflator. 
1994 
81.9 
10.7 
40.2 
19.6 
28.1 
51.3 
32.2 
129.7 
13.6 
20.3 
42.8 
1995 1996 1997 
2.6 -7.6 -3.1 
4.8 5.0 5.3 
2.9 4.1 4.5 
1.7 1.2 2.7 
-1.6 2.0 2.2 
2.4 1.1 5.1 
7.0 5.9 5.9 
6.9 4.5 4.5 
7.4 5.0 5.0 
3.5 3.5 3.5 
5.2 4.0 4.0 
1995 1996 1997 
53.8 110.0 100.0 
9.1 8.8 7.8 
34.0 24.0 17.0 
26.4 24.0 20.0 
26.0 17.0 13.0 
27.8 19.0 14.0 
27.8 20.0 17.0 
33.3 35.0 30.0 
9.7 5.8 6.0 
13.6 10.0 7.4 
24.8 22.1 17.4 
1998 
1.1 
5.5 
5.2 
3.5 
2.9 
2.8 
5.4 
3.4 
4.5 
4.5 
4.7 
1998 
25.0 
6.8 
15.0 
15.0 
10.0 
12.0 
12.0 
25.2 
5.5 
8.8 
11.8 
Trade balance of 10 applicant countries 
(%) 
Source: European Commission, Autumn 1996 Forecast. 
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positive exception, with a situation that should be close to full 
employment. 
Increased domestic demand in 1995, and more specifically the 
demand for investment goods, pushed up imports and widened 
the trade deficit. 
The slowdown of export growth in 1996 had a further negative 
effect on the external balance in most countries. It is expected 
that in the coming years export demand will rise as a result of 
higher economic growth in the EU and the former Soviet Union. 
Additionally, the increased investment in the previous years will 
improve competitively and push up export opportunities. 
Nevertheless, the trade balance will probably deteriorate further, 
because continued strong final demand will generate sustained 
import growth. • 
Note: The next forecast by the Commission will be published in May 1997. A 
more detailed text of the autumn forecast will be published in Supplement C of 
European Economy issue number three. 
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TO THE EDITOR 
Eastern Europe's nationality structure is rather 
varied, since its historical evolution was 
different from that of western Europe. The 
existence of numerous national minorities in 
the states of central Europe is one of the 
consequences of this evolution. 
I myself have been personally a member of the 
Slovak parliament since 1990 and for four 
years the leader of one of the two 
parliamentary groups of the Hungarian 
coalition. 
Hungarians living in Slovakia strongly 
supported revolutionary change in 1989. They 
permanently support the democratisation of 
society as well as economic changes and the 
Euro-Atlantic integration of Slovakia. They are, 
however, disappointed in view of the recent 
evolution that has taken place in Slovakia in 
political, social and nationalist terms. 
Jn several parts or countries of central Europe 
a dangerous amount of importance is given to 
nationality questions. One of these countries 
is, unfortunately, Slovakia. This can be seen 
mainly in the activities carried out by the 
current governing coalition: last year, an 
undemocratic linguistic law was adopted 
pursuant to which language inspectors will 
soon be travelling across Slovakia having the 
authority to fine anybody for language offences. 
It would seem that the governing coalition does 
not have the political will to adopt the long-
awaited law which was promised on the use of 
minority languages. Those who are more 
favourable to the adoption of such law would 
like to limit its effects simply to use of minority 
languages in administrative matters - while 
the already existing law on the national official 
language contains restrictive sections for every 
area of human life. 
Schools for minorities work under permanent 
pressure of the ministry of education. The 
government keeps trying to transform these. 
schools: first into bilingual schools and then to 
purely Slovak schools, which is considered by 
the 600,000 members of the Hungarian 
community as a threat of assimilation - 27 per 
cent of pupils of Hungarian nationality already 
attend a school where the courses are given in 
Slovak. In addition, in schools where the 
courses are given in Hungarian, the Slovak 
language courses are compulsory right from 
the first year of studies, which means that 
around 94 per cent of all the Hungarian-
speaking citizens of Slovakia do know the 
Slovak language. 
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The problem is not mastering the Slovak 
language, but maintaining and complementing 
the school system for the Hungarian 
community. 
In addition government support for minority 
cultures has been seriously reduced since 1995, 
although such support is guaranteed by law. In 
1995 support of Hungarian culture represented 
only I 4 per cent of the amount given in 1994. 
Many members of minority communities - not 
just Hungarians - believe the situation in the 
cultural area was better even during the 
toughest communist oppression. 
1 am fully aware of the fact that the integration 
process for central Europe is complicated. I do 
not say this question is the only problem which 
remains to be solved. But 1 do believe that with 
a little bit of political will it could be easily 
solved. I am sure that an increased attention 
and assistance by European institutions would 
help a great deal in this matter. 
I believe that in order to improve governments' 
approach to this matter it would be useful to 
create a special programme similar to Phare or 
Tempus. 
Children should be brought up in such a way 
that they would understand that a Hungarian is 
not an enemy for a Slovak, but his partner and 
brother. 
Schools with Slovak teaching language located 
in multilingual areas could also teach at least 
notional Hungarian language, literature and 
history. The reverse of this has been the 
practice in schools with Hungarian teaching 
for several years. 
1 am sure more initiatives could be mentioned, 
but the important thing is to start. 
In conclusion, it should be stressed how 
important it would be if the EU's constant 
attention in this area was felt by the 
governments of central European countries. 
Adoption of minority laws in these countries, 
based on legal standards of the Council of 
Europe and on positive west European 
examples, should also be part of the solution of 
minority problems. 
Pal Csaky 
Chairman, Hungarian Christian 
Democratic Movement 
Bratislava, Slovakia 
TO THE EDITOR 
I would like to comment on an article 
published in the September 1996 issue of 
European Dialogue. I would like to stress 
that Slovak society may nowadays be divided 
into two, more or less equally strong, camps. 
The first one wants unequivocally to become a 
member of the EU and is ready to meet the 
obligations resulting therefrom. This camp is 
represented mainly by the government 
opposition and its supporters. 
The other one claims it is ready to become a 
member, but is not willing to comply with such 
requirements. Unfortunately, these forces form 
the governing coalition. 
This is the reason why Slovakia in its current 
form is not willing to meet all the 
requirements necessary for membership of the 
EU Decisions taken by the governing 
coalition are often ambiguous and unclear. 
There is a big difference between the 
declarations and the actual deeds. One thing 
is sure: Slovakia's failure to become a member 
at the same time as the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary will have serious 
economic and moral consequences. 
it is a tragedy to see how the governing 
coalition plays games with such a serious 
thing like EU membership. Instead of creating 
favourable conditions for Slovakia's 
membership in the EU, it encourages 
nationalist clashes with the Hungarian 
minority, not to mention the declarations 
about Roma citizens by the chairman of the 
Slovak National Party and the fact that the 
bimonthly Zmena, to which members of the 
government coalition contribute, was granted 
a prestigious award. 
The message the government is sending to the 
EU may be summarised as follows: "Do not 
interfere in our internal problems. We will 
settle them by ourselves and leave us alone. " 
Although it is obvious that integration into the 
EU means our internal problems become also 
their problem, as long as the government 
coalition's attitude towards the EU remains 
unchanged, Slovakia s knocking on the EU 
door will remain unanswered. 
Julius Kovacs 
Chairman, Man and Future 
Vel'ky Krtis , Slovakia 
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